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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
La VELL KEMP and THELMA 
ALICE KEMP, his wife, 
Third Party Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
vs. 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE 
This is an action involving a contest between the 
Third Party Plaintiffs-Appellants and Defendant-Re· 
spondent as to a priority of mortgage betwe(:m the Appel-
lants, who were vendors of the property and took back 
a first mortgage to secure the unpaid balance of the 
purchase price, and the Defendant-Respondent, who as 
a lender, loaned part of the money for the purchase 
price and received back a Deed of Trust or mortgage to 
secure the payment of the moneys advanced for part of 
the purchase price and other moneys loaned. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury and submitted on two 
special interrogatories. The lower court rendered its 
decision in favor of the Defendant-Respondent and de-
nied Plaintiffs -Appellants' Motion for a New Trial 
From the judgment for the Defendant-Respondent, Third 
Party Plaintiffs-Appellants appeal 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Third Party Plaintiffs-Appellants seek reversal of 
the judgment of the lower oourt. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
La Veil Kemp and Thelma Alice Kemp, his wife, 
Appellants, were owners either in fee or by virtue of 
purchasers on a real estate contract, of certain tracts of 
looated at Draper, Utah. They were lay people 
:111d int>xpe.rienced in the handling of real estate transac-
tions being more experienced in the egg producing busi-
ness. They sold their property to Dr. Joseph W. Noble 
in whom they had confidence, for the sum of $40,000.00 
payable at $11,000.00 cash and the remaining $29,000.00 
to be paid in monthly installments evidenced by a Prom-
Note and a first mortgage on the property. Rely-
ing upon the agreement and representations of Dr. Noble, 
they executed and delivered a Warranty Deed to Dr. 
Noble and received back the Promissory Note and the 
mortgage; these documents having been prepared by Dr. 
Noble's attorney. This transaction took place in the latter 
part of November 1964. 
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Dr. Noble in turn made an application t:o Zions First 
National Bank to borrow money, part of which was to 
pay the down payment owed to the Kemps, part of which 
was t:o pay the costs of moving certain improvements 
from Holladay t:o the Draper property and part of which 
was to be used for his own use in the sum of $35,000.00 
total. Zions First National Bank also received a mort-
gage to secure its note which purportedly was also a 
first mortgage. Zions First National Bank prepared the 
closing statement for the parties. Zions First National 
Bank also handled certain moneys held by them for the 
paying of placing certain improvements on the Draper 
property. Dr. Noble in turn sold the property to a 
Ferroll Fullmer on a contract for $64,000.00. Due to 
survey and title problems, Zions First National Bank 
made disbursements on or about December 4, 1964 and 
recorded its mortgage on that day. The Kemps, not 
knowing that they had to record their mortgage, did not 
record their mortgage until 1966, nearly two years later. 
The dates on the Noble-Kemp transaction, to-wit: 
'J'he Deed, Mortgage and Note are apparently filled in 
by Dr. Noble in that the Deed has a date of November 30, 
but ref erring to a Mortgage made of even date. 
The jury unanimously found that Zions First Na-
tional Bank reasonably should have been aware of the 
unpaid balance on the purchase price owed by Dr. Noble 
to the Kemps. 
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ARGUMENT 
WHICH MORTGAGE HAS PRIORITY, AN 
UNRECORDED PURCHASE MONEY MORT-
GAGE OR A RECORDED MORTGAGE OF 
A THIRD PARTY LENDER WHO DID NOT 
HAVE ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE 
UNPAID BALANCE BUT HAD ENOUGH 
INFORMATION THAT IT SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN AWARE OF AN UNPAID BALANCET 
Plaintiffs contend that their mortgage is prior to 
Zions First National Bank in two ways: 
A. By virtue of a purchase money mortgage; and 
B. Constructive notice on the part of Zions First 
National Bank or notice of inquiry. 
A. Purchase money mortgage: This type of pur-
chase money mortgage where a seller, pursU8lllt to a 
prior contract or without one, conveys title to a buyer 
and received ,at that time part of the purchase money 
and receives as part of the same transaction, a mortgage 
upon the property to secure the balance of the purchase 
money. Zions First Nationru Bank's position is also a 
form of a purehase money mortgage who advances part 
of the purchase price and ·a mortgage back to secure 
not only the part of the money loaned for the purchase 
{Jroperty, but also for the balance of the money loaned. 
This type of situation presents a most difficult question 
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as to the priority of these purchase money mortgages, 
Because of this type of problem, your writer respectful!) 
u:rges the court to read ve:ry oa:refully, the dissertation 
on this subject jn 4 Amenean Law of Property 219. 226, : 
Because c,f the manuer in which this ::,ubject haR been 
trt>a'too in the aforesaid reference, thi.s writer wishes to 
quote thfr, those :matters wh1.oh bt=> wishes 
to !:le stressed. Each qnote wiH be followed by the 
m,· pages wherC'.in the q<.HJtP be found, to-wit. 
". , . It is familiar l;'.arning that a purchase rno11e>· 
mortg2ge, executed at the same time as the deed 
of pnrchase of land, or in pnrsnance of agree-
ment as part of one continuous transact1:nn, t::ikPi:; 
precedence over anv other claim or lien attaching 
to the JH'Operty th:rongh the vendee-mortgagor. 
This is so tlto ugh the claim antida tef; the 
f'Xecntion of tb'" wo1tp;age to the seller It will 
also l!Bve priui <- d' ;;_ i:-o in favor of a t]1i1d 
)Wrso.n ad' 11 -'ti:· lh'-' <>has<" '11Tn.eY iiaid. +n 
'chc> ,Pnrlor, provlu· :he 1T11,n1•y wa;3 lo: . uwd foi 
ptu-pm:;e onl · .'' · (· 1nphasis t>dded) :t20 . 
. ¥/here the ('C•n LerJt. i;.; bt"tw<>er.. o. Jmn·hai'(" 
mo ne v rnoi-tgage k a. tbll'c1 person -,vho adv a.nee' 
part of the pm cnase }H'J\;e and a. pnrc1mse moue: 
mortgage to the vendor for [he balance, the 1att;ir 
:s gi•,cen e·J<c:n if he had of till' 
:Fenner," Pages 221 
' 1 ••• Several rationales have been advanced for 
tlns favoritism of the Jaw for the purchase mone.\' 
mortgagee. The :rri;:;,st venern.blc B;od frequently 
stated explanation is that of transitory seiiin 
The idea is that title shot into the grantee and 
out of him again into the purchase money rnort-
() 
gagee, so fleetingly - quasi uno flattu, in one 
breath, as it were - that no other interest had 
time to fasten itself to it: the grantee-mortgagor 
must be regarded as a mere conduit. Such a theory 
b:reaks down in lien states where the fee remains 
P'ffmanently in the granfaec.morlgagor. It also 
·Ir:,; inconsistent with the cases of quite common 
occurrence in which some considerable time 
elapses between the conveyance to the mortgagor 
and the execution of the mortgage. If the reason 
were to be (aken literally it would require the 
e:tecution of the deed of purchase and the excu-
tion of the mo,rtgage to be practically simultan-
eous, something that is ordinarily not feasible and 
not required by the cases. As was said by an able 
1udge in a leading case, "An examination of the 
!'ases will show that the real test is not whether 
ihP deed and mortgage were in fact executed at 
the same instant, or even on the same day, but 
whether they were parts of one continuous trans-
ilction, and so -intended to be, so that the two 
should be given contemporane-0us 
c;peration in oT·<l<"r to promote the intent of the 
parties.'' Pa,ges 222-223. 
" .. A netter sb:tte1l!ent of the reason for the rule 
iB that {he title comes to the purchaser already 
charged witJ1 the encumbrance in favor of the 
grantor-mortgagol'.'; that regardless of the form 
all that the transa,ction ever transfers is the re-
demption right While such a conclusion would 
!Square with the decisions where the purchase 
money mortgage goes to the vendor, it is more 
difficnlt to apply it to the mortgage going to a 
third party lender of the purchase price, although 
It has been advanced in such a case. Furthermore, 
it would seem that the opposite conclusion could 
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have been reached just as easily. Indeed it would 
have been easier to do so, since in f onn there 
is a transfer of the fall title without reservation 
l 
and the grantee then by a separate mortgage 
instrument creates the charge on it. So, unless 1 
the matter is dug into more deeply, one is left 
unsatisfied as to why this one of two perfectly 
possible conclusions has been chosen. 
A little delving, though, does give more illum-
inating answers. One is somewhat technical and 
legalistic. The other more satisfactorily deals 1 
with it as a matter of intrinsic fairness based upon 
the just expectations on the part of the purchase ' 
money mortgagee. The first answer suggests that 
the purchase money mortgage always takes the 
place of an equitable interest in the property that 
precedes any lien or interest of any kind attaching 
to the purchaser's estate at the time of acquiring 
title. Where there is a. prior contract of sale: this 
equitable interest consists of a specifically en-
forceable contract right to have the purchase 
money mortgage given on taking title, and the 
equitable: estate under the purchase contract is 
subject to this right. Where there is no prior 
contract the vendor has left in him on conveying 
title without receiving payment an equitable: ven-
dor's lien. When the purchase money mortgage 
is given it merely replaces and takes the priority 
of one of the other of these prio,r equities, and this 
is so whether it is given at once or subsequently, 
provided it is part of the same transaction. The 
priority of the third party lender of the purchase 
money is an extension of this. He is said to be 
in the position of an assignee of prior equitable 
rights of the vendor, a theory similar to onr 
advanced when the question was as to the applica-
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bility of the St.atute of Frauds t.o a promise to 
give a mortgage on Jands to be acquired with 
money loaned for that purpose by the promisee. 
The other answer justifies the doctrine on 
the equity and justice of protecting one who has 
parted with his property on the faith of having 
a security interest in it until the money for which 
he was exchanging it is received, as against per-
sons who, for different reasons, have inferior 
claims." Pages 224-225. 
" ... As against other mortgagee claimants to the 
property, especially those who have made their 
loan for the purpose of paying part of the pur-
chase the question is closer. These, unlike 
the Qthers, have relied upon getting pa.id out of 
the same specific property and have parted with 
value on that reliane.e. Even so, the vendor has 
the edge because the property he is relying on 
for payment was previously his up to the time 
of sale and mortgage back. There was never an 
instant when he relinquished a hold on it. And 
he would never have parted with it at all except 
upon the belief and faith that if his buyer de-
faulted he could either recapture his property or 
get paid out of it. And this is normally so even 
though he may know that his buyer is going to 
finance. the deal in part by borrowing some of 
the purchase money from another and by giving 
him a mortgage on the property. Other mort-
gages, on the other hand, even including lenders 
of purchase money, parted only with money in 
which they retained no interest whatsoever, and 
placed their reliance for repayment of their debts 
on getting a security interest in other property 
not only never previously owned by them but not 
even owned by the mortgagor at the time the 
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money was loaned, even though they might not 
have known that fact. This difference in attitude 
toward the hazard of losing property previously 
owned and that of not getting an interest in prop-
erty which had never before belonged to the 
claimant is an old and important one." Pages 225- 1 
226. 
The lower court in its Memorandum Decision, hall 
cited a Utah case, State vs. Johnson, 268 Pac. 561, for 
the premise that the mortgage for purchase money must 
be executed simultaneously with the deed of conveyance 
from the Yendor. A reading of this case was dicta and 
that the case turned on uncontroverted facts th:at the 
purchase money mortgage was in fact intended to be a 
second mortgage and the seller is the one who procured 
the borrowed money and handled the complete transac-
tion. It is also important to note that there was nf'ar!y 
a month's time elapsed from the date of the deed and 
the mortgage. In a much later Utah case) McMurdie u' 
Shugg, 107 P2d 163, the court discussed the vendors lit'n 
as being valid even though there were only promissory 
notes executed at a much later time. 
It is the writer's opinion that the reasoning set forth 
in the American Law of Property justly sets forth the 
reason for equity favoring the owner of the property. 
It could also be stated that irrespective of the dates 
shown on the document, it is certainly obvious that the 
overall intent was one continuous transaction and that 
both Kemps and Zions First National Bank were inten-
tionally misled by the fraud on the part of Dr. Noble. 
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B. Constructive notice of inquiry notice. It is ele-
mentary that a person is charged with having notice of 
all matter reflected in a properly recorded document in a 
recorder's office whether or not he has actual knowledge 
or not. This is constructive notice. One form of con-
structive notice is, "inquiry notice." 
". . . It exists when the circumstances are such 
that a purchaser is in possession of facts which 
would lead a reasonable man in his position to 
make an investigation that would advise him of 
the existence of prior unrecorded rights. He is 
said to have constructive notice of their existence 
whether he does or does not make the investiga-
tion. Th authorities are unanimous in holding 
that he has notice of whatever the search would 
disclose." No. 4 American Law of Property, para-
graph 17 .11 pages 565 and 566. Also see Reilly vs. 
McLean, 84 Utah 551, 563, 37 P.(2d) 799 (1934; 
Corey vs. Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 P.(2d) 940 
(1933), Le Vine vs. Whitehouse, 37 Utah 260, 109 
Pac. 2. 
If Kemps had of recorded their mortgage in the 
recorder's office prior to the recording of Zions First 
National Bank's mortgage, there can hardly be a ques-
tion that Kemp's mortgage would be prior whether Zions 
First National Bank had actual notice or had not actual 
notice of the recording; this is constructive notice. By 
the same token, if Zions First National Bank has con-
structive notice by virtue of the knowledge of the facts 
that it had, as found by the jury, they have constructive 
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notice of the seller's rights in the property. When a 
bank has, or should have, knowledge that a person is 
selling property, the bank can very easily protect itself 
by merely asking the Kemps at the time they signed 
the closing statement as to whether or not there is an 
unpaid balance on the purchase price and as between 
experienced real estate mortgage personnel as opposed 
to inexperienced chicken ranchers, the owner of the 
property should be favored. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is Appellants' contention that the 
vendor purchase money mortgage has priority over a 
lendors purchase money mortgage, and secondly, the 
bank had constructive notice of the vendors mortgage 
and was the bank's responsibiPy to make inquiry. Eitht:r 
one of the two theories gives the Kemps priority, arid 1t. 
combination of the two, should create httle problem :n 
giving relief to the Kemps. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EVERETT E. DAHL 
Attorney for Third Party 
Plaintiffs Appellants 
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